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Abstract 
This paper deals with the determinants of labour out-migration from agriculture across 
153 EU regions over the 1990-2008 period. The central aim is to shed light on the role 
played by CAP payments on this important adjustment process. Using static and dynamic 
panel data methods, we show that standard neo-classic drivers, like the relative income 
and the relative labour share, represented significant determinants of the inter-sectoral 
migration  of  the  agricultural  labour.  Overall,  CAP  payments  have  contributed 
significantly to job creation in agriculture, although the magnitude of the economic effect 
is quite small. Moreover, Pillar I subsidies have exerted an effect from three to five times 
stronger than Pillar II payments. 
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In  the  last  fifty  years  European  countries’  agricultural  sector  experienced  dramatic 
adjustments  in  their  labour  markets,  showing  an  impressive  out-migration  of  the 
agricultural labour force. Try to understand how the common agricultural policy (CAP) 
has affected this process, represents an important policy issue rarely investigated from an 
European-wide perspective (Shucksmith et al., 2005).  
Was  the  CAP  effective  in  keeping  labour  force  in  agriculture,  or,  differently,  it 
played a poor job ? In times of growing budget pressure and high unemployment rates 
across EU member states, try to answer this question appears a fundamental step for 
future CAP reforms. To maintain and create jobs in agriculture and rural areas has been a 
traditional  (indirect)
1  objective  of  the  CAP,  an  objective  recently  re-stated  and 
emphasized by several EU’s official documents (see, e.g., European Commission, 2010; 
European Parliament, 2010).
2   
Current evidence on the effect of farm policies on farm labour allocation can be 
classified into two broad categories (see Glauben et al., 2006). Empirical studies at farm-
household  level based  on  micro-data  (e.g.  Woldehanna  et  al.,  2000;  Ooms and  Hall, 
2005;  Ahearn  et  al.,  2006;  Hennessy  and  Rehman,  2008;  Douarin,  2008);  studies 
focusing on the farm labour (re)allocation at aggregate country and/or regional level (e.g. 
Barkley, 1990; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; D’Antoni and Mishra, 2010; Petrick and 
Zier, 2011). Our paper falls within this second strand of literature.  
Especially due to data limitations, actual evidence on the effect of CAP subsidies on 
off-farm labour migration, other than quite inconclusive, is largely confined to specific 
country or regional case studies (Petrick and Zier, 2011). Although interesting and often 
rich of detailed interpretations, such studies measure the CAP  effects  within a single 
country or region. This approach has the advantage of keeping fixed many factors like 
institutions,  and  circumvent  problems  associated  to  cross-country/region  analyses. 
However, these findings are difficult to generalize to other countries and regions that 
have  wide  differences  in  development,  labour  market  institutions  and  farm  structure. 
Until  now,  the  lack  of  comparable  and  consistent  data  on  the  CAP  payments  at  EU 
regional  level,  has  prevented  researchers  from  adopting  an  approach  that  takes  into 
account both cross country/region observable and unobservable characteristics.
3 
The main objective of this paper is to offer a preliminary contribution that moves in 
that direction. Specifically, the paper investigates the effect of CAP payments on inter-
sectoral labour reallocation, extending previous studies in three main directions. First, our 
analysis has a broad coverage, considering 153 EU regions over the period from 1990 to 
2008. Second, the effects of CAP instruments  are  analyzed focusing on both Pillar  I 
                                                 
1 Indirect because, although ‘maintain (and create) jobs in agriculture and rural areas’ was not an initial 
explicit objective of the CAP, the large emphasis given to the ‘income support’, implicitly may leads to a 
reduction of off-farm labour migration, ceteris paribus. See Section (2) for details.  
2  The  European  Commission reflection  about  the  future  of  the  CAP  -  ‘The  CAP  Toward  2020’  (EC, 
COM(2010)  672)  -  explicitly  addressed  agricultural  and  rural  labour  issues  in  several  sections  of  the 
document. Labour and rural areas employments issues are also well represented in the recent European 
Parliament document on the CAP reforms - ‘On the Future of the CAP after 2013’ (EP 439.972).  
3 A notable exception is the paper of Esposti (2007), who investigated the effect of CAP Pillar I payments 
on economic growth and convergence across EU regions over the 1989-2000 period.  4 
 
payments  (coupled  and  decoupled),  and  on  several  Pillar  II  rural  development 
instruments. Indeed, with the exception of Petrick and Zier (2011), who studied the entire 
portfolio  of  CAP  measures,  previous  analyses  have  normally  considered  only  one 
instrument at a time. Third, we rely on modern panel data methods, estimating both static 
and dynamic migration equations, in order to account for several identification issues, 
like heterogeneity and dynamics. Finally, we deliver a back-of-the-envelope calculation 
of the net benefits of the CAP in terms of farm job creation. 
Overall, we identify positive causal effects of the CAP on job creation in agriculture. 
In our preferred specification and procedure, we estimate a long-run elasticity of out-farm 
migration to overall CAP subsidies of about -0.16. However, this average value masks 
substantial  heterogeneity  across  policy  instruments.  Indeed,  while  we  do  not  detect 
significant  differences  between  coupled  and  decoupled  payments,  strong  differences 
emerged by comparing Pillar I vs. Pillar II measures, where the former shows an effect of 
about two time stronger than the later. Finally, a back-of-the-envelope calculation, based 
on our preferred specifications, suggests that, on average, the cost of keeping a worker in 
agriculture is about 27.000 €.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides our 
conceptual framework and the empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the data and how 
we measure the CAP payments at EU regional level. In Section 4 the results are presented 
and discussed. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Conceptual model and empirical strategy 
3.1 Out-farm migration equation and measurement problems  
The paper is empirical in nature. However, to rationalize our empirical work, we rely on 
the theory of occupational choice and labour migration decision, that have the roots in the 
Todaro’s two-sectors model (Todaro, 1969), subsequently developed by Mundlak (1979). 
Following  Barkley  (1990),  consider  an  individual  facing  a  given  return  in  two 
mutually exclusive occupations i, say agriculture (i=1) and non-agriculture employment 
(i=2). The choice of the occupation is determined by comparing the discounted utility 
derived from job over his/her career. A worker of age g that retires at time T will face an 
optimization problem as described in equation (1), where r is the discount rate 
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with Xit = qit wit Lit. 
Utility in the period t is a function of both consumption (Xit) and hours of work spent 
in the job (Lit). Migration of an individual from one occupation to another occurs when 
the expected utility derived from a potential profession rise above the utility expected in 
the current job, at the net of the costs incurred to change profession (Cijt). We assume that 
agriculture i is the current occupation, and j is some other non-agricultural occupation. 
Migration from i to j will occur when the net utility is negative (Hik < 0). 
Although the return to labour may be higher in non-agricultural occupation than in 
farming, an agricultural worker involved in job search may discount the higher wage rate 5 
 
(wj) by the probability (qj) of obtaining employment in non-agricultural sector. For that 
reason, the migration from agriculture to other sectors does not occur instantaneously.
4  
A potential migrant has to estimate the probability of obtaining a job in the industrial 
sector, to calculate Hik. Clearly, this probability is affected by macroeconomic conditions, 
like unemployment rate and the relative size of the sectoral labour forces. Other things 
being equal, the larger the non agricultural labour market, the easier it should be to obtain 
a job there. However, as most of the migrations are out of agriculture, the migration will 
increase with the size of the labour force in agriculture (Larson and Mundlak, 1997). 
Moreover, economic conditions in the agricultural sector, like government payments or 
the structure of the family farm, are also expected to affect the migration rate out of 
agriculture.  
The migration of individual k occurs if Hik < 0. An index function fik is used to 
separate  migrants  from  non-migrants:  Hik  fik  £  0  where  fik  =  1  if  Hik  <  0  (migration 
occurs), fik = 0 if Hik ³ 0 (migration does not occur). This index function allows for the 
aggregation of individual migrants by the summation across fik. The gross migration rate 
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where I are people employed in occupation i. 
Because  of  people  flow  from  one  sector  to  another  and  vice-versa,  the  net  out 
migration  from  agriculture  can  be  defined  as  m  =  Mij  –  Mji.  Due  to  data  limitation,  
migration  flows  in  both  directions  are  not  observable.  Thus,  previous  empirical 
applications  measured  out-farm  migration  simply  as  the  growth  rate  in  agricultural 
employment from one year to the next, disregarding the dynamic in the total labour force 
(e.g. D’Antoni and Mishra 2010). This approach can be a reasonable approximation when 
the exercise is conducted within a single country. However, working across EU regions, 
as in the present study, disregarding the differences in the total labour force dynamic at 
regional  level,  can  introduce  a  systematic  bias  in  the  inter-sectoral  labour  migration 
estimates. 
To reduce this potential source of bias, the approach of Larson and Mundlak (1997) 
has been followed, where it is assumed that, without migration, labour in agriculture and 
non-agriculture would grow at the same rate as the total labour force. Deviation from this 
rate are attributed to migration. Formally, the net migration rate is estimated as 
1 1 1 1 1 ] ) 1 ( [ - - - + = t t t L L n L m
,                (3) 
where  1 1) ( - - - = t t t L L L n is the growth rate of  the total labour force.   
Finally, note that this definition of farm out migration does not take into account the 
part-time farming, that  has become an important characteristic of the  EU agricultural 
                                                 
4 Note that the return to labour in this model works as summary statistics, in the sense that structural 
parameters like the substitutability of capital for labour, the (low) income consumption elasticity of farm 
products, and the productivity growth rate, are supposed to affect the migration rate only through their 
effect on the relative returns to labour in the farm and non-farm sectors. For a two sectors growth model 
with farm-non-farm wage gap, that explicitly consider these structural parameters, see Dennis and Iscan 
(2007).  6 
 
labour  market.  Hence,  using  equation  (3)  potentially  leads  to  an  heterogenous 
underestimation of the labour out-migration, as part-time farming differs significantly 
across the EU regions. Thus, our empirical strategy has to be robust to this and others 
kind of regional heterogeneity. 
3.2 Econometric approach 
Armed of this simple theoretical logic and following previous works, the rate of out-farm 
migration m is expected to be, primarily, a function of the relative per-capita income 
between  non-farm  and  farm  activities  (RI),  and  all  other  factors  affecting  the  costs 
incurred to change profession (C).  
Our main goal is to isolate the effect of the CAP on the rate of out-farm migration. 
Following the model’s logic, to the extent to which CAP subsidies (S) are effective in 
transferring income to farmers, then their effect should reduce the farmers propensity to 
migrate  in another  sector,  ceteris  paribus.  The  rate  of  out-farm  migration of  the  EU 
region i at time t can be explained by the following benchmark empirical equation: 
    it it it it it Z S RI m n b b b + + + + = - - - 1 1 2 1 1 0
,                               (4) 
where Z is a vector including all other observable factors like the relative labour share, 
the unemployment rate and the farm and farming characteristics, that affect the migration 
costs C. The error term it i t it e m a n + + = , comprises time fixed effects common to all 
regions  t a , time-invariant regional fixed effects i m , and a time-varying component it e .  
By  including  time  and  regional  fixed  effects,  equation  (4)  is  equivalent  to  a 
difference-in-difference  (D-in-D)  regression  model.  Note  that,  the  use  of  time  and, 
especially,  regional  fixed  effects  are  of  particular  importance  for  our  identification 
assumption. Indeed, the fixed effects control for both observed and unobserved (regional) 
heterogeneity, rendering the assumption of exogeneity of our right-hand side variables 
more credible. This consideration is of vital importance to properly identify the average 
effect of the CAP payments on regional out-farm migration.  Indeed,  the inclusion of 
fixed effects controls for (time invariant) observable and unobservable differences in the 
unit  of  observations,  like  the  stock  of  human  capital,  the  age  structure  of  the  farm 
population, or the share of land under property. These are all variables that can affect the 
farmer decision to migrate, but that change very slowly over time.   
About the identification of the CAP effect, note that the inclusion of fixed effects 
does  a  good  job  in  resolving  endogeneity  bias  due  to  regional  heterogeneity  and/or 
selection  bias.  Hence,  using  (4)  the  key  identification  assumption  is  that  the  policy 
variable,  Sit,  is  not  simultaneously  determined  with  the  regional  rate  of  out-farm 
migration, mit.  
Different arguments justify this assumption. First, because we work at EU regional 
level, it appears plausible to assume that Pillar I payments are exogenous to migration, 
given  that  these  policies  are  decided  at  the  EU  centralized  level.  In  principle,  this 
assumption may be more questionable when Pillar II payments are considered. In fact, in 
this  case  the  policy  making  process  is  also  under  the  responsibility  of  EU  regional 
institutions  (Petrick  and  Zier,  2011),  and  this  may  generate  a  potential  problem  of 
endogeneity bias due to political economy motives. However, the degree of freedom of 7 
 
regional governments to allocate money of Pillar II, affects only the equilibrium between 
different Pillar II measures (and axis), but not their aggregated level. Indeed, the overall 
amount of Pillar II expenditure is predetermined through a bargaining process at EU and 
national level. Finally, because it is plausible to assume that the farmer’s choice to exit at 
time t is affected by the level of CAP support at time t-1, in equation (4) the term S is 
always included as lagged of one year, thus treated as a predetermined variable.   
A  concern  of  using  equation  (4)  is  its  static  nature.  Indeed,  both  D’Antoni  and 
Mishra (2010), for the US, and Petrick and Zier (2011), for three East German Lander, 
showed that ‘dynamics’ considerations may be important in studying the effect of farm 
subsidies on out-farm migration.
5 To tackle with this issue we estimate also a dynamic 
autoregressive specification    
it t i it it it it it Z S RI m m e a m b b b + + + + + + + = - - - - 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 .                         (5) 
Given  the  large  cross-sections  and  the  short  time  series  of  our  data  set,  the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term renders 
the least squared within estimator inconsistent. To avoid this inconsistency, Arellano and 
Bond  (1991)  proposed  a  Generalised  Method  of  Moments  (GMM)  estimator  as  an 
alternative to the within estimator. They suggest to transform the model into a two steps 
procedure based on first difference to eliminate the fixed effects, as a first step. Hence, 
the first-differenced equation will be  
it t it it it it it Z S RI m m e m b b a D + + D + D + D + D = D - - - - 1 1 2 1 1 1 .                 (6) 
Next  in  a  second  step,  the  lagged  difference  of  the  dependent  variable  in  (6)  is 




The sample used for the empirical analysis covers 153 regions of the 15 European Union 
countries, over the period 1990-2008. Table 1 describes the number of regions used for 
each  country,  according  to  the  Nomenclature  of  Statistical  Units  (NUTS)  and 
distinguishing between the NUTS1 and NUTS2. The choice to utilize both NUTS1 and 
NUTS2 is  motivated by the necessity to link data from different sources.  Indeed the 
‘Farm  Accountancy  Data  Network’  (FADN)  regional  classification  does  not  always 
match with the NUTS2 level defined by Eurostat.
6  
Our dependent variable is the net migration rate, obtained as described in equation 
(3).  To  calculate  migration,  we  should use  data  on  labour  starting  from census  data.  
Unfortunately such data are available every ten years and can be transformed as annual 
series  only  with  interpolations.  Thus,  due  to  data  limitation,  we  are  forced  to  use 
                                                 
5 Specifically, D’Antoni and Mishra (2010) showed that to move from a static to a dynamic autoregressive 
specification,  matters  for  the  final  results.  Differently,  Petrick  and  Zier  (2011)  reported  evidence  of 
persistent lags structure for some CAP instruments. 
6 An alternative solution is to apply the FADN information at NUTS1 also for those NUTS2 regions where 
the FADN data is lacking. However, because our empirical strategy exploits especially the within region 
variation in out-farm migration and CAP payments, following this approach does not add substantial ‘new’ 
information to the model structure. 8 
 
employment data to measure annual migration at the EU regional level. As highlighted by 
Butzer et al. (2003), these data present two sets of problems: first, they bring the demand 
for workers into the migration series; second they tend to be more erratic. Nevertheless 
the trend still prevails. 
The inter-sectoral income differential is measured by the ratio of income in non-
agriculture to that in agriculture (RI). Income is calculated as Gross Value Added (GVA) 
per  worker,  at  constant  and  basic  prices.  For  non-agriculture  sector  we  used  the 
difference between total GVA and GVA in agriculture, as well as for non-agricultural 
employment. 
The relative labour force (RL) is calculated as the ratio of employments in the non-
agricultural sector to that in agricultural sector. The measure of population density, is 
calculated as the population ratio to regional area in Km
2. Information on population, 
regional area, unemployment rate, total and sectoral GVA and employment, at the level 
of  NUTS2  and  NUTS1  regions,  come  from  the  Cambridge  Econometric’s  Regional 
Database. 
Finally,  farm  family  worker  is  represented  by  the  number  of  family  members 
working in the farm, and comes from FADN database.  
 
4.1 Policy data 
Given our specific focus on the effect of CAP payments on out-farm migration, the way 
we measure the policy variables at regional level is a critical question, due to the well 
known  lack  of  official  data.  Previous  studies  have  basically  followed  two  different 
approaches: measuring a regionalized producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) as in Anders et 
al. (2004) and Tarditi and Zanias (2001); using the Farm Accountancy Data Network as 
in Shucksmith et al. (2005), and by combining the same source with Eurostat Regio-New 
Cronos database, assuring to the former also a time variation, as in Esposti (2007).  
In  theory,  the  last  approach  is  the  most  suited  for  our  analysis,  where  the 
econometric  identification  has  to  be  based  on  the  within  region  variation  in  CAP 
payments. Unfortunately it has two main shortcomings. First, Eurostat does not provide 
time series data at  regional level for all EU countries
7. Second,  and  more important, 
Eurostat data, based on agriculture sectoral series, do not incorporate decoupled subsidies 
after 2005. Their use would then reduce the time coverage of the analysis, and would 
preclude the possibility of investigate the possible differentiated effect between coupled 
and decoupled payments, as well as the effect of Pillar II policy. 
To overcome the issues above, we adopted a new strategy measuring CAP payments 
starting from the FADN data at regional level. For every region covered by the FADN, 
we have indeed the amount of payments received by the average farm over the period 
1990-2008.  To  the  extent  to  which  the  average  farm  is  representative  of  the  farm 
population,
8  the  computation  of  the  ratio  between  such  farm  CAP  payments  and  the 
                                                 
7 Esposti (2007) resolves this issue by applying the growth rate at the higher aggregation level (NUTS 1) to 
those (NUTS 2) regions whose Eurostat data are lacking. 
8 For each region, the FADN sample is stratified according to the Type of Farming (TF) and the Economic 
Size Unit (ESU) class, while the same stratification is made on the regional farm population; each stratum 
in  the  sample  is  then  weighted  to  render  its  data  representative  of  the  underlying  population.  Such 9 
 
respective farm net income (inclusive of subsidies), offers the possibility to measure a 
consistent regional level of farm protection due to CAP policies.  
Note  that  this  approach  is  fully  consistent  with  previous  empirical  exercises 
conducted  on  the  US  out-farm  migration  (see  Barkely,  1990;  D’Antoni  and  Mishra, 
2010), where the effect of government payments is measured using the ratio between 
farm subsidies to the farm value added at aggregated (country) level.  
A  further  advantage  of  our  approach  is  the  possibility  of  disentangle  CAP  total 
payments  in  their  different  components  (Pillar  I  and  Pillar  II).  Specifically,  we  can  
distinguish  between  coupled  and  decoupled  payments  of  Pillar  I,  and  include  agri-
environmental  payments,  less  favoured  areas  (LFA),  investment  aids  and  a  residual 
category called ‘other’ subsidies of Pillar II
9. Note that some of the latter payments were 
introduced before Agenda 2000, thus the ‘Pillar II’ expression could be not fully correct. 
Nevertheless, we chose to use it to clearly and easily distinguish between CAP market 
subsidies and CAP structural policies.  
Finally, a potential limitation of our policy variable is that it does not capture the 
‘price  support’  component  of  CAP  transfers,  a  component  that  was  in  place  at  a 
decreasing rate until 2003. However, it is important to note that the price component of 
CAP protection in our empirical model is implicitly controlled by the relative income 
variable, RI.  
 
5. Econometric results 
Table 3 reports the static D-in-D estimate of equations (4). The specifications differ with 
respect  to  how  the  policy  variables  are  considered.  Following,  D’Antoni  and  Mishra 
(2010), Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests were used to determine whether the data 
were stationary.
10  All variables, with the exception of relative labour and unemployment 
rate, were found stationary. Thus these two variables were introduced in first difference 
in the final D-in-D specification. 
In line with the labour migration model, the relative income between non-farm and 
farm sector exerts a positive and significant effect on the level of out-farm migration (p-
value < 0.01). The estimated elasticity equals 2.5. Thus, even if such value is smaller than 
the one estimated by Butzer et al. (2003) for Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia (equal 
to 10, 6 and 7, respectively) as well as those estimated by Barkely (1990) for the US 
(equal  to  4.5)  it  lies  in  the  same  order  of  magnitude.  Our  lower  estimated  elasticity 
suggests  that  at  EU  regional  level,  out-farm  migration  is  less  responsive  to  income 
differences. The changes in the relative labour force were also significant and positive. 
As suggested by Larson and Mundlack (1997), this ratio reflects the absorptive ability 
and the opportunity of employment in the non-farm sector.  
Among the other covariates, only the average population density has a significant 
effect on out-farm migration, although its negative sign is contrary to our expectation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
procedure makes FADN data representative at regional level for TF and ESU and, indirectly, for Pillar 1 
payments, while the same may not be assured for Pillar 2 payments. 
9 Pillar I includes: ‘total subsidies on crops’, ‘total subsidies on livestock’ and ‘decoupled payments’. Pillar 
II includes: ‘total support for rural development’ and ‘subsidies on investments’.  
10 Specifically, given the unbalanced panel structure of our dataset, use was made of the Maddala and Wu 
(1999) ADF test for unbalanced panel data.   10 
 
The family workers have the expected negative sign, while the effect of a change in the 
unemployment rate is unexpectedly positive. However they are both always insignificant.  
Moving to the variable of interest, CAP subsidies, Column 1 of Table 3 considers the 
total  level  of  CAP  payments  (Pillar  I plus  Pillar  II)  as policy  variable.  Its  estimated 
coefficient is negative and significant at 1% level. Thus, in general, the CAP played a 
role in keeping labour within agriculture, ceteris paribus. This result is similar to the 
finding of D’Antoni and Mishra (2010) for the US economy, but it goes in an opposite 
direction as for the paper of Petrick and Zier (2011), who showed that with the exclusion 
of agrienvironmental payments, CAP subsidies significantly increase out-farm migration 
in three Eastern German Landers.  
The subsequent regressions in Table 3 display results considering the CAP policy 
instruments separately. Note that we have been forced to conduct the analysis of Pillar I 
and Pillar II policies in isolation, as the two series are strongly collinear.
11 Considering 
first Pillar I payments, the estimated policy coefficient is again negative and strongly 
significant,  both  in  isolation  (column  2),  and  when  the  effect  between  coupled  and 
decoupled subsidies is splitted (column 3). 
Columns (4) and (5) show results for Pillar II policies. Also this group of measures, 
taken as a whole, points to a negative out-farm migration effect, although this effect is 
heterogeneous across instruments. Splitting Pillar II policies, we find that money directed 
to agrienvironmental measures and to less favoured areas (LFA) significantly contributes 
to job creation in agriculture. Differently, investments aids have a positive effect on out-
farm migration, while other Pillar II measures have a negative effect, although both are 
statistically insignificant. Broadly speaking, the results of Pillar II policy are more in line 
with the findings of Petrick and Zier (2011). Finally, in the D-in-D specification we do 
not find any clear effect of a policy shock due to the 2003 Fischler reform. Indeed the 
dummy equal to 1 from 2005 onward (0 otherwise) is never significant.
12 
Next,  Table  4  introduce  dynamic  in  the  specification,  by  the  estimation  of  an 
autoregressive  specification  using  a  difference-GMM  estimator.  This  strategy  should 
shed further light on the robustness of our findings. First, the bottom of Table 4 reports 
standard tests to check for the consistency of the GMM estimator (see Roodman, 2009). 
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation indicates that second order correlation is not 
present. On the contrary, the presence of first order serial correlation suggests that the 
OLS estimator is inconsistent. Moreover, the standard Hansen test confirms that in all 
cases our set of instruments is valid.  
The autocorrelation coefficient is significant and negative, although its magnitude is 
quite low (< 0.1). A negative autocorrelation coefficient suggests that if migration is high 
at time t-1, then it will be lower at time t. This result is consistent with the adjustment 
process under study.  
                                                 
11 We also ran a regression that includes Pillar I and Pillar II payments together, and we observed a strong 
reduction in the magnitude of both estimated coefficients and their significance level. On the contrary, 
when included separately, they are always strongly significant. The correlation coefficient between the two 
series is indeed quite high, and equal to 0.50. 
12 However, a closer inspection of the year fixed effects showed that, when we add the Fischler reform 
dummy, the year fixed effects for 2005 and 2006 turns out to be positive and significant at 5% level, 
indicating some sort of positive out-migration effect of the Fischler reform. Other dummies for policy 
reforms of the ninety were also found to be never significant.  11 
 
In general, the results of the dynamic specification are similar to the static ones, 
although some difference are worth noting. First, the relative labour negatively affects the 
migration rate and it is strongly significant. A possible interpretation is that countries tend 
to converge to similar levels of non-agricultural and agricultural labour ratio. Second, and 
in line with the a priori expectation, in the dynamic model the unemployment rate affects 
negatively  the  rate  of  out-farm  migration.  Third,  the  population  density  is  never 
significant.  Finally,  and  interestingly,  the  dummy  for  the  introduction  of  decoupling 
(equal to 1 from 2005 onwards) now turns out to be negative and significant in all the 
specifications,  but  the  one  where  the  Pillar  I  is  splitted  in  coupled  and  decoupled 
payments (see column 3). This result is puzzling, because on the one hand it seems to 
suggests that the Fischler reform represented a policy shock also from the point of view 
of the farmers decision to exit from the agricultural sector. On the other hand, as we will 
show  later,  we do not  detect  any  relevant difference in  the  migration  effect  between 
coupled and decoupled payments. 
Moving to the policy variables of interest, their estimated coefficients are always 
negative and significant, giving a broad confirmation to the D-in-D results. Considering 
first Pillar I policies (columns 2 and 3) the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is 
slightly  lower  (in  absolute  value)  than  the  corresponding  static  estimates  reported  in 
Table (3). This result is not surprising, because now their coefficients capture short-run 
effects. However, the picture changes somewhat when the policy variables considered are 
those related to the Pillar II. In that case (see columns 4 and 5), the absolute magnitude of 
the coefficients slightly increases passing from the static to the dynamic specification.  
What does all this  means from an economic point of view? Consistent comparison 
between  the  job  creation  effect  of  CAP  policies  can  be  made  on  the  basis  of  their 
respective  elasticities (see Table 5).  Several interesting patterns emerged.  First, a 1% 
increase in total CAP payments decreases out-farm migration of about 0.121% using the 
D-in-D estimator, a value that rise to 0.159% when dynamic is accounted for. Thus, in 
general, the magnitude of the economic effect is rather small, but it increases of about 
30%  using  the  GMM  estimator.  This  conclusion  hold  for  all  the  CAP  payments 
considered. Thus, the comparison of the long-run elasticity across estimators sheds some 
light on the potential estimation bias in using the static model. 
However,  the  average  effect  cancel  out  heterogeneity  across  CAP  instruments. 
Indeed, the long-run elasticity of Pillar I payments (equal to -0.165), is about two times 
higher  in  absolute  value  than  the  elasticity  of  Pillar  II  policies  (equal  to  -0.094). 
Moreover,  the  differences  across  Pillar  II  instruments  are  striking,  and  in  line  with 
common intuition. In fact, LFA payments elasticity (equal to -0.102) is more than 2.4 
times  higher  in  absolute  value  than  agri-environment  payments  elasticity  (-0.043). 
Finally, and interestingly, we do not detect any significant differences in the elasticity 
between coupled and decoupled Pillar I payments, a result not new in the literature (see 
Ahearn et al. 2006; Corsi, 2008). 
Finally, with our estimates at hand and based on a back-of-the-envelope calculation, 
we may infer whether the CAP was effective in keeping labour in agriculture. Using 
results from column (1) of Table 4, on the overall CAP effect on out-farm migration, we 
estimated that to maintain one worker in agriculture taxpayers spent, on average, 27.000 
€ per year. This value is close to the average salary in the old member states, suggesting 12 
 
that the cost of keeping a worker in agriculture, through the CAP, has been very high, at 
least if we disregard the potential positive externalities provided by farmers’ activities.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Understanding the effect of CAP policies is important because a deeper comprehension  
of their incidence may allow to design better policies. This paper gives a contribution in 
that  direction  studying  how  different  CAP  instruments  have  affected  job  creation  in 
agriculture across 153 EU regions over the period 1990-2008.  
By  the  exploitation  of  the  within  and  across-region  variation  in  the  out-farm 
migration and CAP policies, and using both static D-in-D and dynamic GMM panel data 
methods, we find robust evidence that the CAP has played a role in keeping labour force 
in agriculture. Among CAP instruments, we show that Pillar I payments are, so far, the 
most effective in reducing out-farm migration, while the effect of Pillar II payments is 
conditional to the instruments considered. Moreover, we do not detect any significant 
difference on job creation between coupled and decoupled payments. 
By  answering  to  the  initial question  ‘whether the  CAP  was  effective  in keeping 
labour force in agriculture’, we find that using the CAP, the cost to maintain a farmer in 
agriculture corresponds, on average, to his salary itself. So it seems that there is no light 
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United Kingdom (1) 12
Total 153  
Notes:  We  miss  information  on  the  four  French  overseas-departments,  the  two 
Portuguese  regions  Madeira  and  Azores,  the  two  Greek  regions  Voreio  Aigaio and 
Notio  Aigaio,  the  Aland  region  in  Finland,  and  the  Bruxelles-Capitale  region  in 
Belgium due to lack of data. 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Out-farm migration Growth rate 0.026 0.075 -0.939 0.375
Relative Income Ratio 2.114 1.461 0.475 30.92
Relative Labour Ratio 34.36 53.03 1.25 605.45
Unemployment rate % 8.52 5.06 1.59 36.11
Population density Persons /Km2 263.31 513.75 3.01 4796.32
Family Farm Labor Force Annual work unit  1.324 0.256 0.430 2.160
Total payments/VA Share 0.374 0.316 0.000 3.097
Pillar I payments/VA Share 0.276 0.217 0.000 1.982
Coupled payments/VA Share 0.226 0.215 0.000 1.982
Decoupled payments/VA Share 0.050 0.123 0.000 0.750
Pillar II payments/VA Share 0.098 0.144 0.000 1.172 
Source: see text 15 
 
 Table 3. Out-farm migration and the CAP: Difference-in-differences results 
Dependent variable: Out-farm migration
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total payments -0.0083***
(0.0026)














Other pillar II payments -0.0830
(0.2843)
Relative income 0.0071*** 0.0072*** 0.0076*** 0.0071*** 0.0069**
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027)
Relative labour (diff) 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044**
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Unemplyment (diff) 0.1122 0.1112 0.0955 0.1134 0.1143
(0.1293) (0.1289) (0.1272) (0.1300) (0.1316)
Population density -0.1513** -0.1523** -0.1716*** -0.1489** -0.1581**
(0.0692) (0.0685) (0.0654) (0.0703) (0.0716)
Family work  -0.0097 -0.0097 -0.0112 -0.0095 -0.0123
(0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0084)
Decoupling dummy  0.0028 -0.0137* -0.0039 -0.0013 0.0018
(0.0061) (0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0099) (0.0100)
Constant 0.0686*** 0.0695*** 0.0755*** 0.0537** 0.0594**
(0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0213) (0.0234) (0.0231)
No. of obs. 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600
R-Sq 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Difference-in-differences
 
Notes: Region, and year fixed effects included in each regression. Robust standard errors clustered by 





Table 4. Out-farm migration and the CAP: Differences GMM results  
Dependent variable: Out-farm migration
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total payments -0.0088***
(0.0024)














Other pillar II payments -0.1118
(0.1847)
Relative income 0.0066* 0.0066* 0.0072** 0.0065* 0.0063*
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0034)
Relative labour  -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0015*** -0.0016*** -0.0016***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Unemployment  -0.6084** -0.5990** -0.5453* -0.6226** -0.5460**
(0.2693) (0.2670) (0.2836) (0.2721) (0.2584)
Population density 0.0150 0.0129 -0.0177 0.0220 -0.0057
(0.1926) (0.1928) (0.2000) (0.1921) (0.2015)
Family work  -0.0089 -0.0087 -0.0082 -0.0092 -0.0108
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0143)
Decoupling dummy  -0.0158** -0.0158** -0.0046 -0.0160** -0.0141*
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0118) (0.0071) (0.0073)
Lagged migration -0.0799* -0.0801* -0.0806* -0.0796* -0.0825*
(0.0468) (0.0469) (0.0464) (0.0467) (0.0477)
No. of obs. 2411 2411 2411 2411 2411
No. Groups 153 153 153 153 153
No. Instruments 147 147 148 147 150
AR2 test (p-value) 0.748 0.748 0.761 0.747 0.801
Hansen test (p-value) 0.153 0.151 0.152 0.157 0.134
Differences GMM
 
Notes: year fixed effects included in each regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate  statistically  significance  at    10%,  5%  and  1%  level,  respectively.  All  variables  are  used  as 
instruments  in  model.  The  difference-GMM  estimator  is  implemented  in  STATA  using  the  xtabond2 
routine with option laglimits (10). 17 
 
Table 5. Out-farm migration elasticity to CAP payments   
Long-run Short-run
Total payments -0.121 -0.159 -0.146
Pillar I payments -0.143 -0.165 -0.152
Coupled payments -0.110 -0.128 -0.118
Decoupled payments -0.118 -0.125 -0.115
Pillar II payments -0.071 -0.094 -0.087
Agrienvironment -0.030 -0.043 -0.039
Less favoured areas -0.078 -0.102 -0.094
D-in-D GMM - Differences
 
Notes: The table reports sample mean elasticity of CAP policy variables based on difference-in-differences 
and Difference GMM regression results of Table 3 and 4, respectively. 